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LISA PASOLLI
Lors de son élection comme premier ministre en 1960, Louis J. Robichaud
reconnaissait qu’il était urgent de moderniser l’appareil bureaucratique afin que les
gains politiques de la « Révolution atlantique » se traduisent par des programmes
sociaux et économiques réalisables au Nouveau-Brunswick. Pour exercer le
leadership dans la réforme de la fonction publique, Robichaud recruta sept anciens
fonctionnaires sous le gouvernement de la Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
de la Saskatchewan, que l’on appela la « Saskatchewan Mafia ». À partir de leurs
expériences, cet article explore la bureaucratisation de la Révolution atlantique et fait
valoir que ce groupe a joué un rôle crucial dans la transformation de la bureaucratie
politique du Nouveau-Brunswick et, par conséquent, dans la modernisation de
l’ensemble de la province.
Louis J. Robichaud recognized at the time of his election as premier in 1960 that
bureaucratic modernization was urgently needed to translate the political gains of the
“Atlantic Revolution” into workable social and economic programs in New
Brunswick. To provide leadership in civil service reform, Robichaud recruited seven
ex-Saskatchewan Co-operative Commonwealth Federation bureaucrats who became
known as the “Saskatchewan Mafia.” This article uses their experiences to explore
the bureaucratization of the Atlantic Revolution, and argues that this group played a
crucial role in the transformation of New Brunswick’s political bureaucracy and thus
in the modernization of the province as a whole.
NEW BRUNSWICK’S FIRST ELECTED ACADIAN PREMIER, Louis J.
Robichaud, came to power in 1960 determined to move the province into the 20th
century socially and economically. By Robichaud’s own estimation in 1969, the
province had, prior to his election, “been dealing with its difficulties on a piecemeal
basis, achieving only limited industrialization, its people in many areas
underemployed and undereducated, unfairly taxed and over-governed.”1 Robichaud’s
1 Louis J. Robichaud, “New Brunswick: The Sixties as an Era of Progress and Change,” speech
presented at Queen’s University, 24 October 1969, p. 2, Robichaud Papers, RS 416 A/1/9, Provincial
Archives of New Brunswick (PANB). This article is based upon the research conducted for the
author’s master’s thesis, “Bureaucratizing the Atlantic Revolution: The ‘Saskatchewan Mafia’ and the
Modernization of the New Brunswick Civil Service, 1960-1970,” University of New Brunswick,
2007. The author would like to thank Margaret Conrad, Penny Bryden, and James MacGregor for
their helpful comments on drafts on this paper as well as SSHRC and the Canada Research Chair in
Atlantic Canada Studies for financial assistance.
Lisa Pasolli, “Bureaucratizing the Atlantic Revolution: The ‘Saskatchewan Mafia’ in
the New Brunswick Civil Service, 1960-1970,” Acadiensis XXXVIII, no. 1
(Winter/Spring 2009): 126-50.
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Liberal administration had ambitious plans for reform, but the bureaucratic capacity
to manage and implement those plans was lacking. Above all, New Brunswick needed
personnel and leadership to expand, professionalize, and modernize its civil service.2
Luckily for Robichaud and his advisors, in 1964 Ross Thatcher’s Liberals defeated
Woodrow Lloyd’s Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF – and soon to be the
New Democratic Party) in Saskatchewan, and upon Thatcher’s assuming power many
CCF officials resigned. Donald Tansley, the chair of the Medical Care Insurance
Commission, was one. Recognizing the value of Tansley’s experience, Fred Drummie
(Robichaud’s economic advisor) invited him to Fredericton to explore the possibility
of taking up a position in Robichaud’s administration. In early 1964 Tansley visited
Fredericton to meet Robichaud and other members of the government and civil
service. In a discussion with the premier, Tansley outlined his experience with state-
managed programs such as medicare and government insurance, prompting
Robichaud to declare: “Well, I’m for all those things too, but I’m no bloody socialist!”
Undaunted, and armed with the conviction that Robichaud was a socialist “in
everything but name,” Tansley accepted an offer to become New Brunswick’s new
deputy minister of finance and industry.3 He moved to Fredericton in July 1964, and
was soon followed by six other ex-Saskatchewan bureaucrats – Robert (Bob)
McLarty, Paul Leger, Graham Clarkson, Nancy Bryant, Donald Junk, and Desmond
Fogg – creating a contingent of former CCF civil servants in New Brunswick who
became known as the “Saskatchewan Mafia.”4
This article examines the role and activities of this mafia in New Brunswick’s civil
service and uses their experiences to shed light on the broader process of bureaucratic
modernization necessitated by Robichaud’s programs. In the context of a series of
exciting political gains for the Atlantic region known as the “Atlantic Revolution,” as
well as a nation-wide recognition that a new breed of bureaucrat was needed to
manage the developing welfare state and state-run economic programs, Robichaud
2 The urgent need for administrative reform has been identified by R.A. Young in “Remembering Equal
Opportunity: Clearing the Undergrowth in New Brunswick,” Canadian Public Administration 30, no.
1 (Spring 1987): 88-102 and by Della Stanley in Louis Robichaud: A Decade of Power (Halifax:
Nimbus Publishing Ltd., 1984), 89-96. Young argues that administrative reform was one of four
priorities for Robichaud – the other three being to “respond to federal initiatives,” to improve
municipal administration, and to stimulate economic growth.
3 Donald Tansley, interview by author, tape recording, Ottawa, ON, 30 March 2006 (tapes in
possession of author). See also Stanley, Louis Robichaud, 93.
4 Although perhaps sinister-sounding, the term “Saskatchewan Mafia” is innocuous. It was given to a
group of ex-Saskatchewan bureaucrats who took up positions in Ottawa after 1964, and who began to
meet socially for Sunday morning curling games. Someone began referring to this group as the
“mafia” and the name stuck. Although the Saskatchewan group who moved to Fredericton was not as
a large as the group in Ottawa, nor did they have the same close-knit social relationships that existed
among their federal counterparts, Donald Tansley and his colleagues can be thought of as the New
Brunswick branch of the Saskatchewan Mafia in the sense that they represented the style and
philosophy of public administration embodied by ex-Saskatchewan CCF bureaucrats across the
country. In this sense, it is used widely in scholarly work. See Gregory P. Marchildon, “Foreword,”
in A.W. Johnson’s Dream No Little Dreams: A Biography of the Douglas Government of
Saskatchewan, 1944-1961 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), xxii as well as Bill Waiser,
Saskatchewan: A New History (Calgary: Fifth House, 2005), 391. The author would like to thank
Gregory Marchildon for clarification regarding the origins of the phrase “Saskatchewan Mafia” and
of the academic use of the term.
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was eager to recruit talented civil servants who could allow him to capitalize on
political excitement to create viable programs.5 This article argues that the
Saskatchewan Mafia, and Tansley in particular, drew upon their Saskatchewan
experience to provide guidance and direction to the modernizing Robichaud civil
service. That is not to say that aspirations of modernization did not exist among the
native New Brunswickers in the administration; Robichaud’s small stable of advisors
recognized that the transformation of the provincial bureaucracy was a priority. They
also realized, however, that the province required additional help in making this
happen. Their recruitment of the Saskatchewan Mafia demonstrated their
commitment to serious and prompt change. Without the presence of this mafia, the
New Brunswick bureaucracy would not have transformed as efficiently and rapidly as
it did.
Across Canada in the 1960s, the creation and growth of welfare state programs and
state economic planning necessitated the expansion and reorganization of civil
services at both the federal and provincial levels. In Ottawa, this need was recognized
in 1960 when Lester Pearson appointed the Royal Commission on Government
Organization (Glassco Commission) to investigate the activities and organization of
government departments and agencies.6 Provincial administrations, in particular,
experienced rapid growth. The number of provincial public employees increased by
447 per cent from 1946 to 1971 (compared with a still-impressive increase of 80 per
cent at the federal level). From 1961 to 1971 alone, provincial government
employment in Canada grew by 108 per cent.7 Perhaps more importantly, during these
years the role and characteristics of senior civil servants changed. Expected to move
beyond purely administrative duties to embrace policy-oriented activities, civil
servants entered into a partnership with politicians that Ken Rasmussen describes as
“political administration.”8 The ideal bureaucrat in a post-Second World War public
administration environment, according to Rasmussen, had a background in specialist
and technical education, was hired based on his or her merit rather than through a
5 On the Atlantic Revolution, see Margaret Conrad, “The Atlantic Revolution of the 1950s,” in Beyond
Anger and Longing: Community and Development in Atlantic Canada, ed. Berkeley Fleming
(Fredericton: Centre for Canadian Studies and Acadiensis Press, 1988), 55-96; Margaret Conrad,
“The 1950s: The Decade of Development,” in The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation, ed. E.R.
Forbes and D.A. Muise (Toronto & Fredericton, NB: University of Toronto Press & Acadiensis Press,
1993), 382-420; James Kenny, “Politics and Persistence: New Brunswick’s Hugh John Flemming and
the Atlantic Revolution, 1952-1960,” master’s thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1988; and Ken
Taylor, “Reconstruction and Recovery in the Hinterlands: resources, industry, and infrastructure in
New Brunswick and Saskatchewan, 1945-1970,” PhD diss., University of New Brunswick, 2005.
6 For a study that analyzes some of the changes made as a result of the Glassco Commission, see J.C.
Strick, “Recent Developments in Canadian Financial Administration,” Public Administration 48
(Spring 1970): 69-85.
7 All statistics from J.E. Hodgetts and O.P. Dwivedi, Provincial Governments as Employers: A Survey
of Public Personnel Administration in Canada’s Provinces (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 1974), 10.
8 Ken Rasmussen, “The Douglas Government’s Contribution to Canadian Public Administration and
Policy: The Role and Impact of Senior Officials in the Douglas Government on Canada,” paper
presented at the Douglas Government Symposium, University of Regina, 30 April 2004,
http:/ /www.uregina.ca/gspp/marchildon/symposium/douglas_symposium/documents
/Ken%20Rasmussen%20Speaking%20Notes.pdf.
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patronage appointment, had a respectful relationship with politicians, and held a
commitment to collective bargaining for public employees.9
How these transformations in the provincial bureaucracy unfolded in New
Brunswick has been largely neglected.10 Under Robichaud’s leadership, from 1960 to
1970, the province’s political, cultural, and social landscape underwent far-reaching
changes; but we do not yet know enough about the machinery of government that
managed those reforms. Studies of the Robichaud decade, including Della Stanley’s,
highlight the role that senior civil servants played in terms of policy roles, but rarely
probe deeply into the workings of bureaucratic reform.11 What is missing from our
understanding of the Robichaud era is a portrait of the details of bureaucratic change
that provided the foundation for all other reform programs. This article begins to fill
that gap by focusing on the experiences of the Saskatchewan Mafia – all of whom
played roles in the transformation of the day-to-day bureaucratic mechanisms.
New Brunswick’s bureaucratic modernization took on new urgency in the 1960s
because of the nature of Robichaud’s sweeping slate of political, economic, and social
reforms, which have been documented in detail by a number of historians and political
scientists. Scholars have focused particularly on Robichaud’s Programme of Equal
Opportunity, a reform package based on the Royal Commission on Municipal Finance
and Taxation chaired by Bathurst lawyer Edward Byrne. At the heart of Byrne’s
recommendations was the centralization of “services to people” at the provincial
9 For more on the development of postwar civil services, see Rasmussen, “The Douglas Government’s
Contribution”; Gregory Marchildon, “Public Administration and Policy Innovation in a Federal State:
The Saskatchewan Tradition,” paper presented at the University of Regina, 8 January 2001,
http://www.uregina.ca/sipp/documents/pdf/gmjan.pdf; Hodgetts and Dwivedi, Provincial
Governments as Employers; J.E. Hodgetts, The Canadian Public Service: A Physiology of
Government, 1867-1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974); J.E. Hodgetts, The Biography
of an Institution: The Civil Service Commission of Canada, 1908-1967 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1972); J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982); Donald Savoie, Breaking the Bargain: Public Servants,
Ministers, and Parliament (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003); and P.E. Bryden, Planners
and Politicians: Liberal Politics and Social Policy, 1957-1968 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 1997).
10 For studies that examine bureaucratic development in other provinces, see Hubert Guindon, “The
Modernization of Quebec and the Legitimacy of the Canadian State,” in Modernization and the
Canadian State, ed. Daniel Glenday, Hubert Guindon, and Allan Turowetz (Toronto: Macmillan of
Canada, 1978), 212-46; Hubert Guindon, “The Social Evolution of Quebec Reconsidered,” in French
Canadian Society, vol. 1, ed. Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1964), 37-161; and J.G. Channing, The Effects of Transition to Confederation on Public
Administration in Newfoundland (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1982).
11 Stanley, Louis Robichaud, especially 89-96. Stanley, for instance, points to Robichaud’s recognition
“that the civil service needed to be expanded and moulded into a more efficient advisory decision-
making and policy-formulating body.” Other examinations of civil service reform include Pier
Bouchard and Sylvain Vézina, “Modernizing New Brunswick’s Public Administration: The
Robichaud Model,” in The Robichaud Era, 1960-70: Colloquium Proceedings (Moncton: Canadian
Institute for Research on Regional Development, 2001), 38-53; Norman J. Ruff, “Administrative
Reform and Development: A Study of Administrative Adaptation to Provincial Development Goals
and the Re-organization of Provincial Government and Local Government in New Brunswick, 1963-
1967,” PhD diss., McGill University, 1972; and Sacha Richard, “The Other ‘Quiet Revolution’: The
Evolution of New Brunswick’s Acadian Community, 1955-1972,” PhD diss., University of Ottawa,
2006.
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level, including health care, education, welfare, and the administration of justice.12
Byrne’s report formed the basis of the 1965 White Paper on the Responsibilities of
Government, which signified the government’s commitment to dealing with social
development in a meaningful way.13 The result was the Programme of Equal
Opportunity, a collection of approximately 130 pieces of legislation that transferred a
huge amount of administrative responsibility from municipalities to the provincial
government, which necessitated not only an expanded civil service but new sources
of financing.14
Equal Opportunity and the accompanying plans for state-driven economic
initiatives were ambitious; but they were thought possible in large part thanks to the
gains of what Margaret Conrad calls the “Atlantic Revolution” in the 1950s.15 The
Atlantic Revolution was of critical importance to the provinces because, despite
legitimate efforts in the post-Second World War era to stimulate the region’s lagging
economy, regional interests had consistently been “sidelined” by federal policies.16 In
12 Records of the Royal Commission on Municipal Finance and Taxation (Byrne Commission), 1962,
RS179, PANB.
13 Province of New Brunswick, White Paper on the Responsibilities of Government, tabled in the
Legislative Assembly 4 March 1965 (Fredericton: Queen’s Printer). One of the authors was Donald
Tansley.
14 By the mid-1960s, Robichaud’s program was beginning to attract attention from across the country.
In 1966, a correspondent with the Toronto Globe and Mail wrote “New Brunswick has set out to bring
municipal government into the space age. It may well be Canada’s most interesting experiment in
administrative reform.” See Bert Burgoyne, “New Brunswick: pioneer in administrative reform?”
Toronto Globe and Mail, 3 January 1966, D-3-10, in Equal Opportunity Programme – Scrapbook and
Clippings, MC856/MS1A, PANB. For more detailed studies on Equal Opportunity, see Stanley, Louis
Robichaud, 137-62; Ralph Krueger, “The Provincial-Municipal Government Revolution in New
Brunswick,” Canadian Public Administration 13, no. 1 (Spring 1970): 50-99; Harley Louis
d’Entremont, “Provincial Restructuring of Municipal Government: A Comparative Analysis of New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia,” PhD diss., University of Western Ontario, 1985; and R.A. Young,
“Remembering Equal Opportunity: Clearing the Undergrowth in New Brunswick,” Canadian Public
Administration 30, no. 1 (Spring 1987): 88-102.
15 Conrad, “The Atlantic Revolution of the 1950s,” 55-96. Conrad borrows the term from W.S.
MacNutt, “The Atlantic Revolution,” Atlantic Advocate, June 1957.
16 Donald Savoie, Visiting Grandchildren: Economic Development in the Maritimes (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2006), 13. See also E.R. Forbes, “Consolidating Disparity: The Maritimes and
Industrialization of Canada During the Second World War,” in Challenging the Regional Stereotype:
Essays on the 20th Century Maritimes (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1989), 172-99; E.R. Forbes,
“The Atlantic Provinces, Free Trade, and the Canadian Constitution,” in Challenging the Regional
Stereotype, 200-16; James L. Kenny, “‘We Must Speculate to Accumulate!’: Mineral Development
and the Limits of State Intervention, New Brunswick, 1952-1960,” Acadiensis XXIII, no.  2 (Spring
1994): 94-123; James L. Kenny and Andrew Secord, “Public Power for Industry: A Re-Examination
of the New Brunswick Case, 1940-1960,” Acadiensis XXX, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 84-108; Kenny,
“Politics and Persistence”; and Taylor, “Reconstruction and Recovery in the Hinterlands.” An earlier,
and different, interpretation of regional economic disparity comes from R.A. Young, who argues that
New Brunswick premiers J.B. McNair (1940-52) and Hugh John Flemming (1952-60), and not federal
policies, were to blame for the province’s lagging economy. In Young’s view, McNair and Flemming
were more interested in pursuing politically expedient projects such as road-building and electrification
rather than working to ensure meaningful economic development in the province. Young argues, for
example, that Flemming’s commitment to the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission (NBEPC)
helped the organization become “symbolic of economic progress in New Brunswick,” but that it was
“progress” driven primarily by “corporate impulses” and the desire to keep local political elites happy.
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the 1950s, however, political and business leaders in the Atlantic Provinces put aside
their partisan differences in the common belief that “state planning was the only
alternative to economic inferiority, and that federal aid was the necessary condition
for the success of such planning”; they subsequently presented a united front to
Ottawa and insisted on the need for more federal funding for the region. This Atlantic
Revolution resulted in a number of highly publicized political and financial victories
for the region, including the creation of the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council
(APEC) in 1954, the inaugural meeting of the Conference of Atlantic Premiers in
1956, the introduction of equalization in the 1956 federal budget, Diefenbaker’s $29.5
million loan to New Brunswick’s Beechwood power project, and the earmarking of
$25 million annually for four years for the region in the form of the Atlantic Provinces
Adjustment Grants.17 Into the 1960s, these federal commitments to the region took the
form of initiatives such as the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Act in
1961 (ARDA), the Atlantic Development Board (ADB) in 1962, and the Fund for
Rural Economic Development (FRED) in 1966.18 This influx of federal transfers,
along with a willingness to run budget deficits,19 meant that Robichaud’s
administration could commit itself to action – especially on social initiatives.
What is less well understood, and what this paper seeks to address, is the
administrative and bureaucratic effort that was required to turn political will into
practical programs. Optimism regarding the future of the region was running high
when Robichaud was elected in 1960, but the new premier recognized that despite
public victories the “Atlantic agenda remained unfinished business.”20 The Atlantic
Revolution had outlined the necessary scope of economic and social development for
New Brunswick, and the political commitment for change (that would eventually be
represented by Equal Opportunity) was present, but to translate political victories into
workable programs required effort at another level. What was required, in other
words, was the bureaucratization of the Atlantic Revolution.
The Saskatchewan Mafia in New Brunswick was crucial to ensuring this
bureaucratization occurred as smoothly as possible. Tansley and his colleagues had
many years experience working with the CCF administrations of Tommy Douglas and
Woodrow Lloyd (1941 to 1964), where they had become knowledgeable about state-
run social and economic initiatives. Robichaud and his advisors knew in 1960 that the
civil service needed to be revamped, but they also knew that the people and resources
to make that happen were lacking within the existing bureaucracy.21 The influence of
Consequently, NBEPC focused more on its own security, expansion, and autonomy than on ensuring
a cheap power supply to all New Brunswickers. See R.A. Young, “‘and the people will sink into
despair’: Reconstruction in New Brunswick, 1942-52,” Canadian Historical Review 69, no. 2 (1988):
127 and R.A. Young, “Planning for Power: The New Brunswick Electric Power Commission in the
1950s,” Acadiensis XII, no. 1 (Autumn 1982): 99.
17 Conrad, “The Atlantic Revolution,” 60, 78.
18 The ARDA was renamed the Agricultural and Rural Development Act in 1966. In 1969, Trudeau
consolidated these programs into the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE). See
Della Stanley, “The 1960s: The Illusions and Realities of Progress,” in Forbes and Muise, The
Atlantic Provinces in Confederation, 429.
19 Stanley, Louis Robichaud, 98.
20 Taylor, “Reconstruction and Recovery in the Hinterlands,” 199.
21 Stanley, Louis Robichaud, 90-1.
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the Saskatchewan Mafia within New Brunswick’s public administration led to
changes in financial management, budget preparation, federal-provincial relations,
personnel organization, and employer-employee relations in the civil service.
Tansley, in particular, had a long-lasting impact on how government administration
was undertaken in New Brunswick, and his experiences are the focus of this article.
Tansley was recruited to New Brunswick fresh from creating the entire administrative
structure of medicare in Saskatchewan, and his expertise and confidence helped
ensure that New Brunswick’s administrative overhaul occurred as efficiently as
possible. He was the principal architect of the province’s new financial administration
structure, but his influence extended to many other areas of administration, including
civil service staff relations and even economic policy.22 McLarty and Leger were also
principal players in terms of economic planning and relations with Ottawa; Bryant,
Clarkson, Junk, and Fogg played lesser roles, but they were still important players in
the sense that they applied Saskatchewan lessons to New Brunswick. Viewing this
mafia’s experiences as an important part of bureaucratic modernization in New
Brunswick allows us to better understand how the success of Robichaud’s reforms
depended in large part on the transformation of the provincial bureaucracy.
The civil service that Robichaud had inherited in 1960 has been described as
“inward-looking” and “in general . . . still being run and based upon rules which had
been established during the Depression.”23 Civil service reform was therefore a
priority for Robichaud in his first term, indicated by his almost immediate
commissioning of the Chicago consulting firm Public Administration Services (PAS)
to provide a portrait of what the scope of reform would entail. PAS undertook studies
of position classification, pay scales, and, eventually, an intensive study of the
organization of the entire administration. Their report of 1962, the Organization and
Administration of the Public Services of the Province of New Brunswick, made it
bluntly obvious that the current systems and practices of the civil service were
inadequate, and their condemnation of the civil service extended into virtually every
department and agency. They suggested that study and planning for policy
development, especially in the economic arena, were “lacking in quality and intensity
and [were] performed in a less than fully coordinated matter.” Budgetary
administration, they argued, proceeded in an “informal and less than adequate
fashion” and, in terms of personnel administration (which they pointed out
“profoundly influences the effectiveness” of the public service), the report suggested
that a new plan was needed to ensure that staffing was adequate to meet program
requirements. They put much of the onus on the Civil Service Commission in terms
22 In his study of French New Brunswick, Richard Wilbur refers to Tansley as “Fredericton’s most
experienced and most influential civil servant.” See Richard Wilbur, The Rise of French New
Brunswick (Halifax: Formac, 1988), 218. Stanley also singles Tansley out for his leadership; see
Stanley, Louis Robichaud, 92-5.
23 These remarks came from Fred Drummie, Robichaud’s economic advisor, who also described the
civil service as “inbred.” One of these rules, for example, was that no more than one member from a
family could be employed by the government. See Fred Drummie, interview by author, tape
recording, Fredericton, NB, 16 May 2006 (tapes in possession of author). It was also clear that
patronage had been rampant in previous administrations; see, for example, Dalton Camp, Gentlemen,
Players and Politicians (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), especially 20, 26-9.
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of the responsibility for carrying out these recommendations. In addition, they
suggested that new systems of training, recruitment, discipline, and supervision were
needed at all levels and recommended that more employees of the provincial
government (i.e., non-permanent employees) actually be brought under the authority
of the Civil Service Act, which would further the goal of reducing patronage and
improving training programs.24 Besides these general recommendations that affected
the whole of the government organization, the PAS report also included detailed plans
for reorganization on a department-by-department basis, which they laid out in
organizational charts (see figures 1 and 2).
To address PAS’s recommendations, Robichaud began working towards building
up a stable of talented bureaucrats to manage the modernization of the province.
Hiring young officials such as Economic Advisor Fred Drummie and economist Bill
Smith was a first step, but to fill out the roster of senior civil servants, as Stanley
argues, “the province had to find them beyond its borders.”25 In 1964, personnel issues
took on new urgency with the retirement of Provincial Treasurer Thomas O’Brien.
This was when Drummie began looking for the “best person in Canada” to fill the
position.26 Looking west to the pool of jobless bureaucrats in Saskatchewan (by
choice or otherwise), he first offered former deputy minister of finance and industry
A.W. Johnson the job.27 Having already accepted a position in Ottawa, however,
Johnson recommended Donald Tansley. Drummie readily agreed, noting that Tansley
was “known within the community of other provincial governments and in Ottawa,
and within the financial community,” and this made him an attractive person to have
in New Brunswick’s corner as it embarked on reform programs – the success of which
rested in large part on productive federal-provincial relations. Furthermore, Tansley’s
24 Organization and Administration of the Public Services of the Province of New Brunswick (Chicago:
Public Administration Service, 1962): Report I, 6; Report II, 2, 53-5. These reports are available in
the Robichaud Papers, RS416 B6/2, PANB. The Civil Service Commission of New Brunswick was
created in 1943. Its purpose was to establish uniform standards of employment, to better classify
positions, and to generally increase the security of tenure of public employees – in other words, to
uphold the purpose of the merit principle. Before the 1960s, however, the commission was only
marginally effective. Hugh Thorburn wrote in 1960 that “political patronage still plays an important
part in placement” of civil servants. See Hugh Thorburn, Politics in New Brunswick (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1960), 160. Under Robichaud, the commission began to have more
authority. In particular, he extended the application of the merit principle to seeking qualified
candidates outside of the province’s borders, deciding that the “search for high-quality candidates
should not be confined to native sons of New Brunswick.” This more than anything illustrated
Robichaud’s commitment to the merit principle – the willingness to hire the best person for the job,
based solely on qualifications. See J.D. Love, “The Merit Principle in the Provincial Governments of
Atlantic Canada,” Canadian Public Administration 31, no. 1 (Fall 1988): 343.
25 Stanley, Louis Robichaud, 92. Throughout the 1960s Fred Drummie was among the most influential
of Robichaud’s inner circle. Bill Smith was an economic advisor to Hugh John Flemming and an
economist at the University of New Brunswick. Another important figure was Charles McElman, a
former Liberal organizer who became Robichaud’s executive assistant.
26 Drummie, interview by author, 16 May 2006.
27 M. Brownstone suggests that there were up to 40 senior officials left jobless after Thatcher’s election.
Many resigned for ideological reasons; others were dismissed. See M. Brownstone, “The Douglas-
Lloyd Governments: Innovations and Bureaucratic Adaptation,” in Essays on the Left: Essays in
Honour of T.C. Douglas, ed. Laurier LaPierre (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 66-9. See
also Waiser, Saskatchewan, 391.
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background in the tradition of CCF social and economic planning was a “bonus” to
complement his “good solid understanding of what provincial government is about,”
his “clear philosophical position of . . . public service,” and the “awful lot of detailed
know-how” that he possessed.28
Robichaud was eager to infuse his administration with the kind of talent and
capability Tansley offered, and it was an easy decision to install him as the deputy
minister of the Department of Finance and Industry.29 Tansley arrived in Fredericton
excited to be part of what he called “perhaps the most fundamental, most dramatic and
most rapid reforms to local government and provincial services which have ever been
attempted in Canada.”30 He was soon followed by, and in fact had a hand in recruiting,
six of his former Saskatchewan colleagues. In Saskatchewan, these seven public
servants had developed their skills in the “Saskatchewan tradition of public
administration” and particularly in the Saskatchewan Budget Bureau, which Allan
Blakeney has called the “best college of public administration in Canada at the
time.”31 An emphasis on long-term and closely integrated planning and budgeting
functions was a hallmark of the Saskatchewan tradition,32 along with progressive
policies with regards to employer-employee relations.33 As creators and managers of
welfare state programs, medicare foremost among them, Saskatchewan civil servants
gained administrative experience that civil servants in other jurisdictions were years
from acquiring. Graduates of the Saskatchewan tradition left the CCF administration
28 Drummie, interview by author, 16 May 2006. An account of Tansley’s decision to take up a position
in New Brunswick can also be found in William M. Vaughn and Richard L. Bellaire, “The
Introduction of Public Service Collective Bargaining in New Brunswick,” paper presented at the
annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Fredericton, New Brunswick (8-11
June 1977), 26. Tansley was also offered a position in Ottawa with the Secretary of the Treasury
Board.
29 Tansley, interview by author, 30 March 2006.
30 Donald Tansley, “Comments: Symposium on Public Administration and the Douglas Government,”
presented at the Douglas Government Symposium, University of Regina, 30 April 2004,
http://www.uregina.ca/gspp/marchildon/symposium/douglas_symposium/documents/Don%20
Tansley%20Speaking%20Notes.pdf.
31 Allan Blakeney, “Johnson Symposium: Douglas Government’s Contribution to Canadian Public
Administration and Policy,” paper presented at the Douglas Government Symposium, University of
Regina, 30 April 2004, http://www.uregina.ca/gspp/marchildon/symposium/douglas_symposium/
documents/Allen%20Blakeney %20Speaking%20Notes.pdf.
32 Douglas established the Budget Bureau and the Economic Advisory and Planning Board (EAPB) in
1946. These two bodies, along with the Treasury Board, ensured that budgeting was closely tied to
policy planning in order that long-term economic plans for the province could be developed. In
addition, the Government Finance Office (GFO) coordinated all the activities of the province’s Crown
corporations. For a more detailed discussion of planning and budgeting in the Douglas administration,
see Johnson, Dream No Little Dreams, 120-41, 193-5; Brownstone, “The Douglas-Lloyd
Governments”; and George Cadbury, “Planning in Saskatchewan,” in LaPierre, Essays on the Left,
51-64.
33 Saskatchewan civil servants were awarded the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike in
1944. The federal government would not grant these rights to its employees until more than 20 years
later. See Robert McLaren, The Saskatchewan Practice of Public Administration in Historical
Perspective (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press, 1998), 89 and P.K. Kuruvilla, “Collective Bargaining in
the Canadian Federal Public Service,” in Public Administration in Canada: Selected Readings, 5th
ed., ed. Kenneth Kernaghan (Toronto: Methuen, 1985), 224-34.
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after its defeat with skills that made them attractive to other administrations, and a
number of them made a particularly significant impact in Ottawa with the Lester
Pearson government.34
In New Brunswick, the hiring of “outsiders” was, as Tansley suggested, a big step
for the small province.35 This was especially true when it came to Tansley himself, the
most influential and publicly recognized of the Saskatchewan Mafia. His role in the
administration extended “far beyond his assigned duties” as deputy minister of
finance and industry and secretary to the Treasury Board, and the various roles he
played in the government often put him at the centre of the political storms created by
Equal Opportunity legislation and controversial industrial ventures.36 For many, his
status as a newcomer – a person “from away” – only contributed to the displeasure
many people had with his hiring. “Tansley – that’s not a New Brunswick name, is it?”
was a query he heard more than once upon his arrival to Fredericton. It was not only
political opponents who were irritated by his appointment. Tansley recalls at least one
“hate note” being sent from an anonymous member of the bureaucracy, and Minister
of Public Works André Richard initially opposed his hiring.37
One thing that Tansley could not be criticized for was a lack of training and
experience in public administration. A Saskatchewan native, he was born in Regina in
1925 and, after serving in the Second World War, returned to attend the University of
Saskatchewan where he received Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Commerce
degrees in 1950 with specializations in economics and business administration.
Immediately upon completion of university, he accepted a job with the Douglas
government in the Treasury Department, where he remained until 1960. His
reputation as a skilled administrator earned him the role of temporarily replacing
Johnson as deputy minister of finance from 1957 to 1960.38 Upon Johnson’s return,
Tansley moved on to serve as executive director of the Government Finance Office
from 1960 to 1962, an organization that functioned as a holding company for the
province’s Crown corporations. By 1962, Premier Woodrow Lloyd was on the
lookout for someone to chair the Medical Care Insurance Commission, a position that
would require thick skin and superior organizational and management abilities.
Beginning with little more than “a table, a telephone and a piece of legislation,”
Tansley created the structure of the commission and maintained it for two years.
Following his four-year tenure in New Brunswick, Tansley, like nearly all other
34 This includes A.W. Johnson (Saskatchewan’s deputy provincial treasurer who moved to Ottawa in
1964 to become the assistant deputy minister of finance), Tommy Shoyama (Douglas’s chief
economic advisor who joined the Economic Council of Canada in 1964), and Tommy Macleod (who
moved to Ottawa in 1964 to take a position in the Canadian International Development Agency). See
Marchildon, “Foreword,” in Johnson, Dream No Little Dreams, xxi-vi.
35 “Don Tansley Interview,” interview by Janet Toole, transcribed, 29 January 1990, p. 6, MC 1830
(Oral Histories), PANB.
36 Vaughn and Bellaire, “Public Service Collective Bargaining in New Brunswick,” 27.
37 Tansley, interview by author, 30 March 2006. Richard eventually came around in terms of Tansley,
confessing some years later that he was pleased with the latter’s appointment to the provincial civil
service.
38 During these years Johnson was attending Harvard to obtain a doctorate in public administration.
Douglas had instituted a generous educational leave policy, of which many of his senior officials took
advantage.
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members of the Saskatchewan Mafia, ended up in Ottawa where, among other roles,
he served as the administrator under the Anti-Inflation Act, a role which gave him the
quasi-judicial functions of adjudicating wage and price cases heard by the Anti-
Inflation Board.39
Of all of the Saskatchewan Mafia installed in New Brunswick, it is Tansley whose
career provides the most insight into Robichaud’s modernizing civil service. As
deputy minister of finance and industry from 1964 to 1968, he was involved in
financial administration as well as programs for economic and industrial
development. Along with his deputy minister portfolio, Tansley also served as
secretary of the Treasury Board and secretary of the New Brunswick Development
Corporation. His close ties with Drummie, both professionally and personally, meant
that he was consulted on all of the most pressing issues facing the government,
including the drafting of the White Paper on the Responsibilities of Government in
1965 as well as the details of the Programme of Equal Opportunity. During his years
in New Brunswick, Tansley reformed the province’s accounting and budgeting
procedures, contributed to better staff relations in the civil service, fostered better
federal-provincial relations, and gave new direction to public administration in the
province by instituting new standards for consistency, coherence, and accountability.
Upon arriving in Fredericton in 1964, Tansley assumed the administrative reins of
a finance department that had, in his words, “everything but the quill pen.”40 The
department relied on a hand-written account ledger book to oversee the financial
management of the province, a system obviously inadequate for the new
responsibilities that came along with Equal Opportunity. One of Tansley’s first
undertakings, then, was to transform the Department of Finance into a “professionally
staffed, modern, computerized” department.41 He personally recruited and hired a
number of financial specialists and accountants to work in the department, and
remained concerned throughout his stay in New Brunswick that the government make
a concerted effort to recruit professional and technical staff.42 Tansley made no secret
of the fact that he was interested in “stealing” key Saskatchewan talents, since his
experience in the Saskatchewan Budget Bureau had familiarized him with the
importance of sound financial management and he was confident in the abilities of his
former colleagues.43 Credit for the creation of a modern finance department in New
Brunswick belongs almost entirely to Tansley.
A key component of the transformation of the overall financial administration of
the province was the introduction of a new computer system. New Brunswick had first
started using a centralized computer system for accounting functions early in 1963,
but by late 1964 it was found that some “features have proven to be unsatisfactory
39 All biographical information came from Tansley, interview by author, 30 March 2006.
40 Tansley, interview by author, 30 March 2006.
41 Tansley, “Comments: Symposium on Public Administration and the Douglas Government.”
42 For example, Tansley personally recruited Dick Fletcher from APEC to the Finance Department, and
Fletcher remained with the government for a number of years as a key player in the development of
an overall economic policy for the province. See C.H. Forsyth to Hon. L.J. Robichaud, memorandum,
29 December 1966, RS 416, 111/1966, file “Finance, Dept of, July 1966-Jan 1967,” PANB as well as
C.A. Murray to D.D. Tansley, memorandum, “The ongoing problem of recruiting professional and
technical civil servants,” 4 July 1966, RS 416, 59/1966, file “Civil Service Commission,” PANB.
43 Tansley, “Comments: Symposium on Public Administration and the Douglas Government.”
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both to operating departments and to the Department of Finance.”44 Tansley struck an
Accounting Review Committee, which included himself, Drummie, and four others,
to undertake a detailed study of the accounting system and the entire computer
operation. This study covered questions such as whether the present computer
applications were appropriate and economical as well as whether the equipment being
used was the best available (especially with regards to accounting systems). The
committee submitted a report to Treasury Board in August 1965 recommending the
acquisition of a new computer and, most importantly, a “greatly expanded staff of
professional people” to operate and maintain the system.
Treasury Board agreed with the recommendations and empowered Tansley to
purchase a new computer as well as approving new positions (a director of Computer
Services and systems analysts).45 Recruitment of trained technical personnel proved a
problem, so Tansley enlisted the help of the Toronto consulting firm KCS, which he
was familiar with from his medicare days.46 KCS used one of their own people as
acting director of Computer Services for the government until a permanent director
was found, and in the interim managed the operations of the province’s new G.E. 415
computer and trained staff to operate the system.47 The introduction of a computer
system was an invaluable asset not only to the financial management of the province,
but also to the management of provincial responsibilities such as property assessments
and tax collection. It allowed the government to increase consistency and efficiency
in its business, and was also symbolic of the centralization of administration that was
taking place in the province.
Another problem area was the province’s financial legislation. Realizing that the
finance department had neither the time nor the resources to undertake a thorough
review and rewriting of the existing legislation, Tansley looked to Ottawa for
assistance. A federal consultant was seconded to Fredericton and within six months
he had drafted the new Financial Administration Act, which rationalized the basic
foundation and organization of the province’s financial management. Under the new
legislation the Treasury Board was given broader authority, especially with regards to
budgetary procedures and rates and conditions of employment in the civil service. The
draft also called for the creation of a Consolidated Revenue Fund that would eliminate
the need for separate bank accounts for “special purpose monies” and that would
greatly benefit the management of government accounts by simplifying “accounting
and cheque issues procedures” and allowing for more careful supervision of funds.48
To complement the new Financial Administration Act and the modernized
Department of Finance, Tansley also worked to introduce new procedures for budget
preparation and review. These changes were first felt as departments started to prepare
44 D.D. Tansley to all deputy ministers, memorandum, “Centralized Computer Services,” 23 December
1964, RS 416 121/1964, file “Department of Finance,” PANB.
45 D.D. Tansley to L.G. DesBrisay, memorandum, “Progress Report on New Computer,” 2 November
1965, RS 416, 102/1965, file “Department of Industry,” PANB.
46 Tansley, interview by author, 30 March 2006.
47 D.D. Tansley to all deputy heads, memorandum, “Computer Centre – Progress Report,” 7 March
1966, RS 416, 110/1966, file “Finance, Dept. of, Nov (65)-June (66),” PANB.
48 W.L. Parr to D.D. Tansley, 10 September 1965, pp. 1, 2, RS 416, 104/1965, file “Department of
Industry,” PANB. This consultant’s name was W.L. Parr.
23501-07 Pasolli Article:Book - Master Setup  31/07/09  2:55 PM  Page 139
Acadiensis140
their estimates for the 1965-66 budget. According to Tansley, the new budget review
system was a “straight copycat” of what he used in Regina, and it required detailed
information regarding revenues and expenditures from each department.49 As both the
deputy minister of finance and secretary of the Treasury Board, Tansley had perhaps
the most authority of anyone to influence the direction of the budget and he used his
influence to collaborate closely with all deputies.50 Individual meetings with these
deputies were arranged in which Tansley and the respective deputy went over, line by
line, the department’s estimates. This was often a shock to deputies, who had never
before had anyone say to them “No, you can’t have 30 new employees – try and
justify 10 for me” (as Tansley often had to say). With this new emphasis on
bureaucratic accountability, it was no wonder that a common refrain heard around
budget time was “Tansley can’t add, but he sure as hell can subtract.”51
This new emphasis on closely supervised budgeting procedures was meant not
only to “promote more accurate budgeting” but also to encourage greater emphasis on
departmental planning, improve the timing of estimates submissions (which had in
previous years been rushed and, therefore, carelessly done),52 and, most importantly,
“provide Cabinet with a greater opportunity to participate in the formation of the
budget and . . . provide for a more thorough consideration of policy and the financial
implications of all budgetary requests.”53 Ministers and their deputies were expected
to stick to a timeline that included strict deadlines for the submission of estimates and
departmental “Budget Plans.” A cabinet budget conference was held for the first time
in December 1964 to plan for the 1965-66 budget and, following the conference,
departments were again expected to review their budget plans and further justify any
new programs or increases in expenditures to Tansley and Drummie. In other words,
by the time the budget was introduced in early 1965 it had been rigorously reviewed
and re-reviewed by departmental staff, senior civil servants, and ministers – a process
that up until then had not been the usual practice.54
Coming from a province considered the national leader in granting rights for public
employees, it is no surprise that Tansley also made it a priority to reform civil service
staff relations. Pension reform figured largely into his plans, but that was far
overshadowed by the negotiations around collective bargaining – the achievement of
which marked an important milestone in the modernization of the civil service and
49 Tansley, interview by author, 30 March 2006.
50 Fred Drummie was also closely involved with the development of new budget procedures. He was,
in fact, Tansley’s predecessor as secretary of the Treasury Board, and was the board’s secretary
throughout the fall of 1964 as preparation was done for the 1965-66 budget.
51 Tansley, interview by author, 30 March 2006.
52 Tansley, interview by author, 30 March 2006.
53 F.R Drummie to all deputy ministers, memorandum, “Call for Estimates, 1965-66,” 1 October 1964,
RS 416, 128/1964, file “Treasury Board,” PANB. See also L.G. DesBrisay to all cabinet ministers,
memorandum, “Budget Review Procedures,” 6 October 1964, RS 416 127/1964, file “Treasury
Board,” PANB as well as Treasury Board, “Minutes of Treasury Board Staff Meeting on Budget
Matters,” 24 September 1964, RS 416, 128/1964, file “Treasury Board,” PANB.
54 Tansley’s methods would become the standard for how budgeting was done in the New Brunswick
government. His successor, J.L. Williamson, followed almost exactly the same schedule for estimates
preparation, budget conferences, and Treasury Board meetings as Tansley. See J.L. Williamson to all
deputy heads, memorandum, “Call for Estimates Fiscal Year 1969-70,” 23 September 1968, RS 416,
164/1968, file “Treasury Board – 1968,” PANB.
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brought New Brunswick’s personnel relations up to the standards of other provinces.55
Tansley characterized New Brunswick’s Civil Service Association (CSA), probably
somewhat harshly, as the “poorest excuse for employee representation I’ve ever
seen.”56 Due in large part to Tansley’s insistence, as well as lobbying by the New
Brunswick leadership of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) and the
CSA itself (along with action at the federal level that culminated in the Public Service
Employment Act of 1967), Robichaud appointed McGill University professor Saul
Frankel to head the Royal Commission on Employer-Employee Relations in the Public
Services of New Brunswick.57 After extensive hearings, the Frankel Commission
reported in July 1967 and called for a new act regarding public servants in the province
that would “provide for a system of collective bargaining for many categories of
employees that are . . . excluded from the existing New Brunswick Labour Relations
Act.” Frankel also suggested that Treasury Board be the representative of the
government in negotiations with employees, which would leave the Civil Service
Commission “with the important responsibility of maintaining the merit system in
recruitment and promotion.”58 In addition, Frankel recommended that employees have
the right to belong to a representative organization of their own choosing. Frankel’s
recommendations were heeded closely by the Robichaud government, and in the fall
of 1968 the Public Service Labour Relations Act was passed, which gave full collective
bargaining rights to all public employees (including the right to strike). In December
1969 a new Civil Service Act was passed as a companion to the Public Service Labour
Relations Act, within which responsibility for the negotiation of pay and employment
conditions, organizational planning, position and wage classification, and overall
budgetary control of personnel services was transferred to the Treasury Board, leaving
the Civil Service Commission little to deal with but the staffing of departments.
Although its responsibilities were severely curtailed, the commission praised the new
55 Central News Bureau of New Brunswick, “News Release,” 15 September 1967, RS 416, 120/1967,
file “Finance, Dept. of, 1967,” PANB.
56 Tansley, interview by author, 30 March 2006. The CSA had become an incorporated body in 1954.
Beginning in 1960 negotiations between government and employees was done through the Joint
Council, which was comprised of three government representatives, three CSA representatives, and
one member-at-large, and was the body through which consultation between civil servants and the
government was undertaken. Although the CSA claimed that very existence of the Joint Council
meant, in effect, that collective bargaining was achieved, movement on issues was slow and the
council was generally ineffective. See H.J. Fournier, “Address,” The Civil Service Digest 2, no. 1
(April 1961): 5. Part of Tansley’s dismissive attitude towards the CSA probably had much to do with
its leadership’s view on unionization and the right to strike for public employees. CSA President
Harold Lockhart said at one point “we do not believe that trade unions are the appropriate agencies
in this field” and that public employees should only be permitted to use compulsory binding
arbitration as a last resort in failed negotiations – and never strike action. See Harold L. Lockhart,
“Dinner Address By President Harold L. Lockhart,” The Civil Service Digest 5, no. 9 (December
1964): 20; Harold L. Lockhart, “A Message from the President to the Members of the Association,”
The Civil Service Digest 6, no. 5 (August 1965): 3-9; and Civil Service Association of New
Brunswick, “Submission To The Royal Commission on Employer-Employee Relations in the Public
Services of New Brunswick,” The Civil Service Digest 7, no. 3 (August 1966): 5-7.
57 A very detailed account of public service collective bargaining in New Brunswick is found in Vaughn
and Bellaire, “The Introduction of Public Service Collective Bargaining in New Brunswick.”
58 Louis Robichaud, “The Premier’s Statement – Frankel Commission Report,” The Civil Service Digest
8, no. 4 (July 1967): 33.
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Civil Service Act and the right to strike as a positive step for the civil service.59
Tansley’s experience in Saskatchewan’s Government Finance Office served him well
in the other component of his portfolio – that of industry. Robichaud has been criticized
for failing to develop a comprehensive economic strategy during his administration, but
the social content of Equal Opportunity along with the social policy orientation of federal
shared-cost programs meant that, in relative terms, economic policy had had to take a
back seat.60 Lack of an overarching plan, however, did not mean that Robichaud was not
committed to action on economic initiatives.61 Tansley was heavily involved in
procedures “to protect the government . . . from itself in involvement with industry.”62
Surprised at the lack of protection the government had given itself on projects such as
Brunswick Mining and Smelting, and especially in terms of their dealings with K.C.
Irving, Tansley set to work creating rigid conditions for government loans and
guarantees.63 And the New Brunswick Development Board benefited from having
Tansley as its secretary as he introduced new financial procedures in much the same vein
as he had for the entire government administration.64 He was also involved in such
development projects as the Grand Falls Industrial Complex, the Westmorland Chemical
Park, and especially the Noranda takeover of Brunswick Mining and Smelting.65
A close colleague of Tansley’s when it came to the economic side of government
planning, Bob McLarty arrived in the fall of 1964 to take up a position as an economist.
Originally from Ottawa, McLarty had taken up a position with the Saskatchewan
government at the urging of Johnson, who offered him a job working in federal-
59 Government of New Brunswick, Civil Service Commission Annual Report 1969, 15.
60 Stanley, Louis Robichaud; Stanley, “The 1960s: The Illusions and Realities of Progress,” in Forbes
and Muise, Atlantic Provinces in Confederation, 421-59; Young, “Remembering Equal Opportunity”;
Ruff, “Administrative Reform and Development”; Taylor, “Reconstruction and Recovery in the
Hinterlands.” Another indication of the priority of social planning was that the Office of Government
Organization, the central bureaucratic mechanism for Equal Opportunity, was initially envisioned as
the secretariat to cabinet committee on economic policy. After the Byrne Commission, ideas and
resources were directed towards social policy. See Fred Drummie, interview by author, tape
recording, St. Andrew’s, NB, 20 June 2006 (tape in possession of author).
61 New Brunswick saw major industrial victories during the 1960s, including the Belledune Point
chemical complex, the Mactaquac Power Project, and the Passamaquoddy Tidal Project. In 1963,
Robichaud launched “Operation Prosper” in an effort to bring in foreign investment to expand the
province’s industrial base. See Stanley, Louis Robichaud, 97-103. By far the most comprehensive
study of New Brunswick’s economic development under Robichaud is Taylor’s “Reconstruction and
Recovery in the Hinterlands.”
62 Stanley, Louis Robichaud, 94.
63 “Don Tansley Interview,” interview by Janet Toole, 29 January 1990, 13; Tansley, “Comments:
Symposium on Public Administration and the Douglas Government.” See also John Edward
Belliveau, Little Louis and the Giant K.C. (Hantsport, NS: Lancelot Press, 1980).
64 Wallace S. Bird, “Report on New Brunswick Development Corporation”, undated, RS 416, 13/1965,
file “Industrial Development Corporation (Gormley),” PANB. See also D.D. Tansley to all members
of the New Brunswick Development Corporation, memorandum, “Proposals for Authorization and
Control of Projects – New Brunswick Development Corporation,” 28 October 1965, RS 416, 13/1965,
file “Industrial Development Corporation (Gormley),” PANB. This report was meant to clarify the
administrative procedures of the corporation, establish a “system of authorizations to clarify the
delegation of responsibility,” and “establish the basis on which funds are to be advanced to the
Development Corporation,” among other details.
65 “Don Tansley Interview,” interview by Janet Toole, 29 January 1990, 18. Tansley even bought one
share in Brunswick Mining and Smelting so that he could attend its annual meeting. He was a key
player in the government team that directed the Noranda takeover.
23501-07 Pasolli Article:Book - Master Setup  31/07/09  2:55 PM  Page 142
Saskatchewan Mafia in New Brunswick 143
provincial relations. After becoming familiar with the New Brunswick administration,
Tansley saw a need for someone with experience in the kind of intergovernmental work
that McLarty had done in Saskatchewan, and invited him to consider a position in
Fredericton. McLarty joined Drummie in the Office of the Economic Advisor (OEA) as
the director of economic research in the summer of 1965. Specializing in federal-
provincial relations, he held positions in New Brunswick and Ottawa simultaneously,
continuing to work part-time for Johnson in the federal finance department.
Aside from Tansley, McLarty was the Saskatchewan Mafia member who was most
closely involved with the government’s day-to-day operations. Respected for being a
first-class economist with a good feel for government, McLarty was chosen to replace
Fred Drummie as provincial economic advisor when Drummie assumed the
directorship of the Office on Government Organization (OGO) in 1965.66 In 1966
McLarty was already thinking about an overall development strategy for the province
and drafted a memo to Drummie proposing a research strategy that could “facilitate the
organization and carrying out of an integrated economic development policy by the
Government of New Brunswick.” Excerpts from this memo figured largely in the
anonymous major report entitled “Development Policy Formulation and
Administration,” which was presented at the 1967-68 cabinet budget conference. In
both McLarty’s memorandum and the report, it was recommended that the government
undertake a detailed review of the province’s economic policy – one that would assess
future development potential, determine priorities, and recommend actions. McLarty
suggested that these actions would “clear away a lot of the underbrush” and enable
economic choices to be made by a fully informed government.67
McLarty’s experience in federal-provincial fiscal relations was called upon
frequently. Having Johnson in Ottawa as the deputy minister of finance was a definite
benefit to New Brunswick’s intergovernmental relations, and McLarty was able to use
this connection to foster a productive relationship between Fredericton and Ottawa,
especially in his attendance (along with Drummie and Tansley) at meetings such as
the 1965 federal-provincial conference.68 McLarty’s expertise was also called upon in
the recruitment of specialists, particularly statisticians and economists, who would
provide a solid personnel foundation for the OEA as the province embarked on more
ambitious economic development initiatives.69
66 In fact, Drummie asserted that the only reason he left his post as economic advisor to become OGO
director was because he felt comfortable leaving the Office of the Economic Advisor in the hands of
McLarty. See F.R. Drummie, “Case Study on Change – New Brunswick: Information and Background,”
paper presented at the Institute of Public Administration of Canada conference, St. John’s, NFLD, 3
September 1969, p. 15, MC 21 (Reports on Equal Opportunity Papers), MS1/A/1, PANB.
67 R.A. McLarty to F.R. Drummie, memorandum, “Development Policy,” 14 July 1966, RS 416,
115/1966, file “Economics (Miscellaneous),” PANB; “Development Policy Formulation and
Administration,” brief presented at 1967-68 budget conference, n.d., RS 416, A1/2, file “Economic
Development 1967-69,” PANB.
68 Tansley, “Comments: Symposium on Public Administration and the Douglas Government”; Louis
Robichaud, “Opening Statement of the Hon. Louis J. Robichaud, QC, Premier of New Brunswick,”
presented at the federal-provincial conference, Ottawa, July 1965, RS 416, 94/1965, file “Federal
Provincial Conference 1965,” PANB.
69 R.A. McLarty to J.L. Williamson, memorandum, “Recruitment, Training and Employment of
Statisticians and Economists,” 7 October 1966, RS 416, A6/2, file “Correspondence P.C. Leger,
1965-66,” PANB.
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Leaving the OEA in McLarty’s hands allowed Drummie to focus his attention on
Equal Opportunity, in which capacity he began to work closely with Paul Leger.
Leger arrived in New Brunswick armed with a graduate degree in public
administration and an arrangement with Bill Smith whereby he would work part-time
with the university and part-time with the government.70 When he moved into full-
time government work in 1966, he became director of OGO, taking over from
Drummie. OGO’s critical role in the development of Equal Opportunity legislation
made it the site of some of the most exciting developments in public administration
during the middle part of the decade.
Created in early summer of 1965 as the secretariat to the also newly formed
Cabinet Committee on Government Organization, OGO housed many of the most
senior civil servants in the province and was the driving force behind Equal
Opportunity.71 The series of events that occurred during the summer of 1965
highlighted the importance of OGO’s role. It was during these few short months that
the politicians and civil servants most directly involved with Equal Opportunity had
given themselves several key tasks regarding this program: to clarify “broad policy
objectives”; to “review and agree on the basic goals of government in education,
welfare, health, justice, and municipal affairs”; to define “program implications of
policy decisions”; to explore the “implications of program decisions for provincial-
municipal finance”; to “review the basis or organization for the provincial
administration of new program responsibilities”; to review and write new legislation;
and to undertake a program of public information “to ensure the widest public
understanding of the legislation and implementation program.”72 The staff of OGO
was behind the scenes of all this activity, preparing research reports and
“homogenizing” the legislation into a broad policy framework. It is a testament to the
ability, efficiency, and devotion of OGO employees that it had ready by the end of
October 1965 a full set of preliminary Equal Opportunity legislation – almost 130
pieces of it – to introduce in November. Even more than the ministers themselves, it
was the members of OGO and the deputy ministers who were considered to be the real
experts on the legislation that was the substance of Equal Opportunity.73
When Leger replaced Drummie as director in 1966, OGO staff had moved beyond
the “conceptual period” of policy development and legislation drafting and shifted
their focus to “coordinating the development of the administrative structures and
systems necessary in the provincial government to give effect to the legislation
70 Leger taught political history at UNB. See Paul C. Leger to Mr. S.J. Noumoff, 12 July 1966, RS 416,
A6/2, file “Correspondence P.C. Leger, 1965-66,” PANB.
71 Members of the Cabinet Committee on Government Organization included the premier, the attorney
general, and the ministers of education, health, municipal affairs, and youth and welfare. Another
component of the new administrative structure around the Cabinet Committee on Government
Organization was the Officials Committee, which was chaired by Drummie and consisted of the
deputy ministers of each department represented in the cabinet committee.
72 Office on Government Organization, “Organization and Responsibilities Cabinet Committee on
Government Organization,” 8 July 1965, 5-6, personal files of Fred Drummie. Throughout the
summer, drafts of legislation continuously circulated amongst the officials committee, lawyers, and
the cabinet committee.
73 Drummie, interview by author, 20 June 2006.
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associated with the ‘Program of Equal Opportunity’.”74 In other words, it was up to
Leger to provide the government with the nuts and bolts of the administrative
machinery that would allow Equal Opportunity to become a reality. OGO was home
to 11 employees under Leger’s directorship, all of whom were involved in a great
number and variety of projects from writing endless research papers to public
relations to establishing new financial procedures for the transfer of municipal
services.75 As director of OGO, Leger was responsible for managing and overseeing
the establishment of a new system for property assessment notices and tax collection,
the creation of a new procedure for calculating municipal tax rates, the establishment
of regional offices, and wrapping up the loose ends of such legislation as the Schools
Act and the Assessment Act.76 When OGO was disbanded in late 1967, Leger moved
into the Department of Youth and Welfare, a position that he retained even when
Richard Hatfield took office in 1970.77
One of Leger’s most senior employees in OGO was fellow Saskatchewanite Nancy
Bryant, who was unique among the Saskatchewan Mafia in New Brunswick as the only
female. Bryant, along with Graham Clarkson, Donald Junk, and Desmond Fogg,
assumed a less prominent role in the administration than Tansley, McLarty, and Leger.
Their activities are less evident in the archived memos and reports that circulated within
the government, but what we do know reveals that their Saskatchewan experience and
networks shaped their role in New Brunswick. The lack of a paper trail around Bryant,
Clarkson, Junk, and Fogg is also a commentary on the nature of the civil service in the
1960s. The administration was so small, and officials were so well known to one another,
that decisions were often made by visiting the office down the hall rather than crafting
correspondence.78 Less involved in the “big picture” policy-making, Bryant, Clarkson,
Junk, and Fogg remain relatively invisible in their day-to-day administrative duties.
Nevertheless, we do know that Bryant worked under Tansley in the Saskatchewan
74 F.R. Drummie to the Cabinet Committee on Government Organization, memorandum, “The future
requirements of O.G.O.,” undated [probably late 1965], RS 416, 198/Dec 1965-July 1966, file “Office
on Government Organization,” PANB; Paul Leger to Hon. Louis J. Robichaud, 11 July 1966, RS 416,
196/Dec. 1965-July 1966, file “Office on Government Organization,” PANB.
75 PAS was still closely involved in the work of OGO at this time. Leger notes that PAS had “been
involved in every organization study done with the departments.” See P.C. Leger to Louis Robichaud,
memorandum, “Overall Projects, Staff Assignments, Future of O.G.O.,” 20 December 1966, p. 3, RS
416, A4/15, file “Officials – Administrative Policy,” PANB. In fact, PAS undertook another
comprehensive study to “analyze the broad objectives and specific content of legislation comprising
the program of equal opportunity with respect to its implications for altered responsibilities” in the
departments of the attorney general, education, health, municipal affairs, public works, and youth and
welfare. See Ralph E. Spear to Honourable L.G. DesBrisay, 2 December 1965, RS 416, A6/2, file
“Correspondence, P.C. Leger, 1965-1966,” PANB.
76 P.C. Leger to Louis Robichaud, “Overall Projects, Staff Assignments, Future of O.G.O.,” 20
December 1966. PANB.
77 It is interesting to note that Leger was involved in a little Saskatchewan recruiting of his own. In
December 1966, while visiting Regina, he did his best to convince Jacques Perreault, a junior analyst
in the Saskatchewan Department of Welfare, to move to Fredericton to take up a position in the civil
service. While Leger was not successful – Perreault decided to remain in Saskatchewan to gain more
experience – it is worthwhile to note that the Saskatchewan connection remained strong. See Jacques
Perreault to P.C. Leger, 29 January 1967, Robichaud Files, RS416 A6/3, file “Correspondence, P.C.
Leger, 1966-67,” PANB.
78 Drummie, interview by author, 20 June 2006.
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Budget Bureau as well as in the office of the deputy minister of finance with Johnson.
Described as “an absolutely brilliant researcher” who worked “well below her
capacity,” Tansley and Drummie nonetheless assert that Bryant’s gender had nothing to
do with her being underemployed.79 As a single mother, Bryant may also have had
difficulty working the long hours required of senior civil servants. Like most of the other
members of the Saskatchewan Mafia, Bryant eventually ended up in Ottawa, where she
spent a number of years working for the federal Department of Finance. While in New
Brunswick, she took a variety of roles in the Robichaud administration: it was
recognized among senior bureaucrats that Bryant could “be used effectively at a senior
level with either OEA or Finance,” the areas of administration in which she had gained
much experience in the Saskatchewan Budget Bureau.80 It was generally thought,
however, that her experience in financial administration and research would be
extremely valuable to OGO. In addition to assisting Leger in his duties as secretary to
the Cabinet Committee on Government Organization, she was also involved in a
number of “special projects” for OGO, including a study of records management, a
study of the responsiveness of regional centres across the province, and, as the province
began to think about medicare, a review of the departments of health and youth and
welfare. Bryant was also actively involved in a “detailed examination” of the province’s
policy with respect to military bases in Oromocto and Chatham and, more broadly, in
federal ex-gratia grants. OGO had been serving as the liaison between the provincial and
federal governments on the subject of ex-gratia grants, but until Bryant’s appointment
there had not had anyone devoting substantial attention to the issue.81
Graham Clarkson was a relatively late arrival to Fredericton, taking up the role as
deputy minister of health and welfare in 1967.82 A native of Scotland, Clarkson had
moved to Saskatchewan to take special training in hospital administration at the
University of Saskatchewan and had remained in the province to work in the Douglas
administration. Clarkson was a key player in the doctor’s strike of 1962 and, after the
strike was resolved, he was offered a position in Tansley’s Medical Care Insurance
Commission. He survived Thatcher’s purge of CCF civil servants to serve as the
executive director of the commission and later as deputy minister of health, a position
he held until his move to New Brunswick in 1967. It was during that year that
Robichaud was becoming very interested in medicare, and he and his advisors
recognized that a qualified, experienced person was needed to oversee the province’s
transition to publicly funded health care services. On the advice of Tansley, Clarkson,
a medical doctor as well as a skilled administrator, became their top choice. He was
known not only to Tansley but also to people like Drummie and cabinet minister
Norbert Thériault, who had crossed paths with Clarkson during intergovernmental
meetings on the medicare issue during the 1960s.83 Clarkson was a forceful
79 Tansley, interview by author, 30 March 2006.
80 No author, “Thoughts on Central Machinery in Government,” undated, RS 416, A4/17, file
“Organization of Government,” PANB.
81 P.C. Leger to Louis Robichaud, “Overall Projects, Staff Assignments, Future of O.G.O.,” 20
December 1966, 2-3.
82 In 1967, Robichaud integrated the Department of Health and the Department of Youth and Welfare
with Norbert Thériault as minister.
83 Drummie recalls Clarkson being “extraordinarily equipped” for the position, and Thériault also
recalls being involved in his recruitment. Thériault remembers Clarkson as a “great, great man.” See
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personality whose capabilities allowed him, recalled Tansley, to radically redesign
and restructure the health care system in New Brunswick with “very little fuss.”84
During Clarkson’s time as deputy minister, the Department of Health and Welfare
was in the midst of reforms to a number of its programs, including changes to the
mental health program and welfare services. These reforms required aggressive
administrative skills, something that Clarkson certainly possessed. Upon his arrival in
Fredericton, one of his very first official duties was attendance at the annual general
meeting of the New Brunswick Medical Association. Surprising everyone, Clarkson
requested permission to speak. After introducing himself, Clarkson got right to the
point and declared that the doctors’ fee schedules were too high and needed
immediate reform. While some may have been shocked by his boldness on the first
day on the job, Clarkson’s take-charge personality would prove invaluable to the
reform of health care administration in the province.85
One of Clarkson’s colleagues in the Saskatchewan Department of Health had been
Donald Junk, and when Clarkson identified the need for an assistant, he suggested
Junk for the job. Junk arrived in New Brunswick in 1968 to take up the job as director
of research and planning as well as administration within the Department of Health
and Welfare.86 Junk, along with Desmond Fogg, played important administrative
supporting roles: Junk in personnel functions and Fogg as assistant to Minister of
Labour Bud Williamson. Junk remained in Fredericton into Hatfield’s administration,
and in November 1973 replaced J.C. O’Connor as assistant treasurer of Treasury
Board.87 Fogg left Fredericton for Yellowknife, where he drew upon his journalism
and communications background to establish a newspaper.88
By the end of the 1960s, the New Brunswick civil service had changed in both
quality and quantity. Not only did the administration undergo remarkable change in a
short amount of time, it had to accommodate dramatically more people in doing so,
growing by 133 percent (see Table 1).89 At the level of new structures and processes,
the civil service was transformed into a modern and professional institution:
departmental reorganization, new accounting and budgeting procedures, enforcement
of the merit principle, the introduction of collective bargaining, a renewed focus on
research and planning, and a new approach to economic development were the
characteristics that defined this transformation. Over the course of the decade,
Drummie, interview by author, 16 May 2006 and also “Norbert Thériault Interview,” interview by
Janet Toole, transcribed, 31 January 1990, MC 1833 (Oral Histories), MS/1/B, PANB.
84 Tansley, interview by author, 30 March 2006.
85 Tansley, interview by author, 30 March 2006.
86 Civil Service Commission, Civil Service Commission Minute Book, Volume 5: April 1967-December
1973, 4 September 1968, p. 105, RS 311 (Civil Service Commission Papers), A/8, PANB. Junk’s role
is reported here as “assistant to Dr. Clarkson.”
87 New Brunswick Public Employees Association, “Minutes of the New Brunswick Public Employees
Association Board of Directors Meeting,” 8 December 1973, in papers of the New Brunswick Union
of Public and Private Employees, (located at the office of the New Brunswick Union of Public and
Private Employees, Fredericton, NB).
88 Tansley, interview by author, 30 March 2006. Although Tansley describes Fogg as a “marginal
player,” he adds that “if you worked for the government, and were a friend of mine, you couldn’t help
but be involved” in the program in some capacity.
89 The provincial civil service grew from 2,908 employees in 1959-60 to 6,767 employees in 1969-70.
See New Brunswick, Civil Service Commission Annual Report 1977, 30.
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Robichaud’s administration became one that was capable of managing the new
responsibilities required of it as the province adapted to Equal Opportunity and the
gains of the Atlantic Revolution.90
Provincial administrations in the other Atlantic provinces paid close attention to what
was happening – and who was making it happen – in New Brunswick. Recognizing that
Robichaud and his team were undertaking a remarkable program of modernization, the
other Atlantic premiers were eager to learn from the process and, in many cases, to
borrow the expertise nurtured in New Brunswick. Prince Edward Island in particular
was attempting to address the same types of economic and social problems that New
Brunswick faced as well as the reforms to the civil service that were required as a
prerequisite.91 In 1967 Del Gallagher, a Robichaud advisor, made the move from New
Brunswick to Prince Edward Island to head up the newly formed Economic
Improvement Corporation (EIC), which had a mandate to plan and manage
development programs under the premiership of Alexander Campbell.92 The Civil
Service Commission of New Brunswick reported in 1969 that “we . . . were able to
advise Civil Service representatives of . . . Prince Edward Island who asked for help in
setting up Civil Service Commissions.” This was also true in Newfoundland, where
bureaucrats also requested help from Robichaud’s officials.93 Nova Scotia benefited
from the expertise of Fred Drummie, who was recruited to the Gerald Regan
administration in the early 1970s to work in economic development. New Brunswick
was not unique in its progress in civil service reform, but it was certainly a leader in
terms of how quickly and ambitiously reform was embraced, and it did not take the other
Atlantic provinces long to mine the Robichaud administration for policy and people.
The modernization of New Brunswick’s bureaucracy would not have happened as
efficiently or rapidly if not for the leadership of the Saskatchewan Mafia, and in
particular Tansley, Leger, and McLarty. Della Stanley has suggested that during the
1960s bureaucrats such as these three acquired such responsibility that they virtually
took over from politicians and became a “legislating body” as well as a management
one.94 In interviews Tansley disputed this, but this denial may have been the result of
modesty or stemmed from the fact that he had wielded more power than he himself
90 Issues remained to be addressed, of course, especially with regards to the employment of women and
francophones in the civil service. See Pasolli, “Bureaucratizing the Atlantic Revolution,” 110-15. For
a survey reporting on the usage for French in the civil service, see Hugh G. Thorburn, Ethnic
Participation and Language Use in the Public Service of New Brunswick, study prepared for the
Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Fredericton, NB, 1966), 64-7. See also
Richard, “The Other ‘Quiet Revolution’,” 361-2. A study of women in the New Brunswick civil
service remains to be undertaken, but for an examination of women in the federal civil service see
Nicole S. Morgan, The Equality Game: Women in the Federal Public Service (1908-1987) (Ottawa:
Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1988).
91 See Donald Nemetz, “Managing Development,” in The Garden Transformed: Prince Edward Island,
1945-1980, ed. V. Smitheram et al. (Charlottetown, PE: Ragweed Press, 1982), 155-63.
92 Edward MacDonald, If You’re Stronghearted: Prince Edward Island in the Twentieth Century
(Charlottetown, PE: Prince Edward Island Museum and Heritage Foundation, 2000), 295-8. As
MacDonald points out, most of Gallagher’s colleagues in the EIC were also “from away,” much like
many of Robichaud’s senior officials.
93 Government of New Brunswick, Annual Report of the Civil Service Commission 1969, 14. In an
interview with the author, Donald Tansley also remembers offering advice to Newfoundland’s
developing civil service.
94 Stanley, Louis Robichaud, 95.
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recognized.95 While Tansley may not have “taken over” – and both he and Drummie
insisted in interviews that the final word rested with politicians – it is difficult to deny
the strength of Tansley’s influence. Besides creating an entirely new financial
structure for the province, in his capacity of secretary of Treasury Board and director
of the NBDC Tansley held sway over economic policy in the province – a role he
stepped into naturally given his responsibilities in Saskatchewan’s Government
Finance Office. Furthermore, in a civil service as small as New Brunswick’s it is
pertinent to note that Tansley was well-liked personally as well as professionally. The
high regard in which he was held meant that Tansley’s opinion carried a lot of weight,
no matter what the issue.96 Without him, and without McLarty and Leger and the
remaining members of the “Saskatchewan Mafia” to supplement New Brunswick’s
growing and modernizing civil service, New Brunswick’s development after the
Second World War may well have looked quite different.
The 1960s was an exciting time to be a civil servant in New Brunswick:
government programs facilitated by federal money necessitated an ambitious and
energetic administration while bureaucrats were afforded more influence in the policy
process than ever before. Benefitting from the changes that established the structures
and processes of a modern bureaucracy, the civil service played a key role in planning,
implementing, and managing the reforms of a rapidly changing province. By 1969
Robichaud had the chance to reflect on the changes in his administration:
We have been most fortunate in the past nine years in recruiting
highly competent, professional teams of specialists to staff our
government departments. The new recruitment, and the use of
dedicated staff already employed in the public service when we came
to office, made it possible to create the administrative framework
without which it would have been impossible to implement the
massive legislative program which Equal Opportunity involved. It
was indicative of the new administration’s attitude toward
government that the political background of the teams of specialists
was of no concern. The only prerequisites for employment were the
ability to get things done and the acceptance of new challenges and
new ideas and new solutions to both old and new problems.97
Robichaud’s bureaucratic modernization facilitated the sweeping social and
economic reforms that characterized New Brunswick in the 1960s. Understanding the
roles played by members of the Saskatchewan Mafia allows us to appreciate the
nature of the changes required to make the political victories of the Atlantic
Revolution a reality and to modernize New Brunswick as a whole.
95 Tansley, interview by author, 30 March 2006. Drummie also denies Stanley’s claim. See Drummie,
interview by author, 16 May 2006.
96 Drummie, interview by author, 16 May 2006. Janet Toole and Barry Toole expressed the same
sentiments. See Janet Toole and Barry Toole, interview by author, tape recording, Fredericton, NB, 6
February 2006 (tapes in possession of author).
97 Louis J. Robichaud, “New Brunswick: The Sixties as an Era of Progress and Change,” speech
presented at Queen's University, 24 October 1969, p. 25, RS 416, A1/9, PANB.
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